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Title 
The Redundancy of Positivism as a Paradigm for Nursing Research.  
 
ABSTRACT 
New nursing researchers are faced with a smorgasbord of competing methodologies. 
Sometimes they are encouraged to adopt the research paradigms beloved of their senior 
colleagues. This is a problem if those paradigms are no longer of contemporary 
methodological relevance. The aim of this paper is to provide clarity about current research 
paradigms. It seeks to interrogate the continuing viability of positivism as a guiding paradigm 
for nursing research. It does this by critically analysing the methodological literature. Five 
major paradigms are addressed: the positivist; the interpretivist / constructivist; the 
transformative; the realist; and the postpositivist. Acceptance of interpretivist, transformative 
or realist approaches necessarily entails wholesale rejection of positivism, while acceptance 
of postpositivism involves its partial rejection. Postpositivism has superseded positivism as 
the guiding paradigm of the scientific method. The incorporation in randomised controlled 
trials of postpositivist assumptions indicates that even on the methodological territory that it 
once claimed as its own, positivism has been rendered redundant as an appropriate 
paradigm for contemporary nursing research. 
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Introduction 
As part of their rite of passage into the research community, it is common for new nursing 
researchers to have to defend their methodology and justify their chosen research design. In 
order to be accepted as a respected member of the discipline, there is motivation for them to 
adopt the powerful discourses of the time. In particular, they can be influenced by those held 
in authority regarding what constitutes knowledge and what approaches to its generation are 
acceptable to the discipline. There is a danger that this influence may lead them to adopt 
inappropriate philosophical groundings for their research. The danger is all the more acute if 
the paradigm that the neophyte is being encouraged to adopt is no longer of contemporary 
relevance. 
 
Background 
Paradigms can be defined as sets of beliefs that provide theoretical frameworks for the 
purpose and conduct of research (Kuhn, 1962). These beliefs relate to both ontological 
concerns (relating to the nature of reality or realities) and epistemological issues (relating to 
what can be known about reality/realities). Such perspectives underpin the selection of 
research methodologies. Since the 1970s there has been much debate about the relative 
merits of different paradigms and their application in healthcare research, a debate often 
referred to as the ‘paradigm war’ (Denzin, 2010). The fog of this war has led to confusion 
among many researchers regarding the paradigm within which their research is positioned.  
 
Aim and outline 
The general aim of this paper is to provide clarity on this topic by addressing the current 
relationships between some of the most influential paradigms, and describing how these 
have changed over time. Its specific aim is to interrogate the continuing viability of positivism 
as a guiding paradigm for nursing research. 
 
Competing paradigms will be examined to show how their critical insights have 
fundamentally challenged core aspects of positivism. Four major paradigmatic challenges to 
positivism are examined. While these paradigms have complex histories involving numerous 
thinkers, for heuristic purposes we have identified the origin of each of them with the ideas of 
a single seminal theorist: the Kantian, which led to the development of interpretive and 
constructivist approaches; the Marxian, which led to the development of transformative 
approaches; the Durkheimian, which led to realist approaches; and the Popperian, which led 
to postpositivist approaches. We will argue that acceptance of any of the first three of these 
approaches necessarily entails wholesale rejection of positivism, while acceptance of 
postpositivism involves its partial rejection.   
 
In order to show how positivism, even on the methodological terrain where it was once 
reigned supreme, has been rendered redundant, we will explore how it relates to that 
paragon of contemporary scientific method – the randomised controlled trial.  
 
The source of paradigm confusion  
Much of the paradigm confusion in nursing appears to stem from the sometimes misleading 
information emanating from one source of authority – research methods textbooks. We 
explored this issue by undertaking a content analysis of a number of nursing research books 
published between 2010 and 2015. Coding of descriptors demonstrated that the 
characterisation of positivism was inconsistent, and in some cases anachronistic. Thus, for 
example, while some textbooks clearly explain the differences between positivism and 
postpositivism and position contemporary quantitative research within the postpositivist 
paradigm (Grove et al., 2013), others do not differentiate between the approaches (Grove et 
al., 2015). Indeed, the term postpositivism itself is riven with ambiguity, with no agreed 
definition of it amongst commentators. For some, it is a broad term including both 
interpretivist and objectivist positions (O’Leary, 2004). For others, it is confined to a 
description of Karl Popper’s revision and reformulation of positivism (Cresswell, 2003). 
Because of its greater definitional specificity, it is the latter sense that we will use in this 
paper.  
 
In other instances, authors classify all quantitative research as having its roots in positivism, 
and qualitative research as having its roots in interpretivism or constructivism without 
reference to alternative paradigms or to the broad range of research that comes under their 
influence (McKie, 2014; Topping, 2015). Some textbooks refer to positivism as the 
paradigmatic origin of quantitative research, but do not qualify its current position (Burns and 
Grove, 2011).  Others do make such a qualification, arguing that while quantitative social 
research developed within the positivist paradigm, today it is no longer guided by positivism 
(Grove et al., 2013; Parahoo, 2014). Still others suggest that quantitative research is a 
“…modified positivist position…” (Polit and Beck, 2012: p.12), which is dominant in nursing 
research and, for reasons of simplicity, categorise it as positivism.  Furthermore, there are a 
number of authors that label quantitative and qualitative approaches as ‘paradigms’ rather 
than methodical strategies (Tappen, 2011; LoBiondo-Wood and Haber, 2014). 
 
The lack of consistency in terminology and categorisation of approaches in research 
textbooks is particularly confusing for novice researchers, who are often challenged to justify 
the philosophical underpinnings of their studies. In order to meet this challenge, they need to 
be clear on the differences and similarities between the competing paradigms, and be 
confident in defending the philosophical foundation of their work.  
 
Untangling the elements of this challenge requires an appreciation of the historical 
development of the philosophy of science, including how various philosophical strands relate 
to each other historically and ideationally.  
 
The emergence of the ‘scientific method’ 
‘MAN, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so 
much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he 
neither knows anything nor can do anything’ (Bacon, 1857: Aphorism I). 
 
Before addressing positivism, it is important to set out the context of its emergence. 
According to Karl Popper (1989), it can be seen as an important stage in human intellectual 
evolution.  
 
For Popper, the first great evolutionary break of humans from other animals was the 
development of language, which enabled humans to describe and seek to explain the world 
around them. In early societies, these explanations were animistic and superstitious, 
developing in time into more sophisticated myths and religions with their own hermetically 
sealed schools of thought. A crucial characteristic of these schools, for reasons of societal 
cohesion (Durkheim, 1995), was that their tenets were regarded as inviolate: ‘A school of 
this kind never admits a new idea. New ideas are heresies’ (Popper, 1989:141).  
 
According to Popper, the next momentous stage in human intellectual evolution was the 
emergence of criticism, whereby it was permissible to question established ideas about the 
nature of the world. Criticism found its first expression in the pre-Socratic philosophers of 
classical Greece, but submerged again in Europe with the rise of Platonic idealism and then 
dogmatic Christianity1.  Later, with the Renaissance (the name of which refers to the rebirth 
of classical ideas), followed by the Enlightenment and the rise of science, criticism began to 
be accepted again as a powerful tool for advancing knowledge.   
 
It was in this context that the seventeenth century English philosopher, Francis Bacon, 
promulgated what is known as the scientific method. For Bacon, our understanding of the 
world should not be based on metaphysical systems but on observation. However, he 
accepted scholastic philosophy’s concerns about the unreliability of human interpretation of 
sensory inputs. He argued therefore that our stance towards any claims to empirical 
knowledge should be one of doubt, and that they should be tested systematically and 
repeatedly. He identified the experimental method as the best way of doing this. This 
involved the repeated application of a putative causal state or event to ascertain whether a 
putative effect was consistently detected following its application.  
 
Positivism  
‘All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon's time, that there can be no real knowledge 
but that which is based on observed facts’ (Comte, 1896:29). 
  
The practical successes of natural science were the inspiration for the development of 
positivism as a model for understanding society. The French philosopher and sociologist, 
Auguste Comte, saw science as the means for understanding society and human behaviour. 
He coined the term ‘positive’ philosophy to differentiate it from the negative philosophy, 
which he believed underpinned woolly and metaphysical thinking (Comte, 1875). Comte’s 
positivist approach involved the use of scientific methods to uncover the dynamics of society 
in the same manner that physical science was uncovering the dynamics of the natural world 
(the philosophical term for this common purpose is ‘naturalism’, a term which has somewhat 
confusingly also been adopted by recent qualitative researchers to describe the study of 
people in their ‘natural’ environments. It is used in the former sense in this paper).  
 
Comte believed that scientists should focus on confirmable observations of empirical events 
and this alone should constitute human knowledge. His analogy between the natural and 
social worlds was not limited to his epistemology. At the ontological level, he assumed that 
the people’s actions were subject to social laws in the same way that events in the natural 
world were governed by natural laws.   
 
The word positivism originates from the Latin word ‘positum’ and means that facts are 
‘posited’ or positioned in front of the researcher (Alvesson, 2009). For positivists, objective 
truth existed and the goal of science was to discover it. To uncover truth, the researcher was 
required to be objective and collect facts using methods that were value-free (McEvoy and 
Richards, 2006). By such methods, it was claimed they could identify general laws (McEvoy 
and Richards, 2006; Parahoo, 2014; Weaver and Olson, 2006).  
 
As to what those laws were, positivists took an empiricist approach (empiricism being the 
doctrine that all knowledge is based on experience). They regarded laws as empirically 
observable relations of cause and effect. This reflected the position taken by the Scottish 
eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume (1969). He argued that causal laws are based 
on the empirical experience of ‘constant conjunctions’, whereby one event is observed to 
occur immediately and consistently after another. Thus, causality rests in the relation of 
constant conjunction, rather than in any force external to that relation. In essence, the 
positivist doctrine involved the following logic:  
 
Our minds interpret the world through our senses, and because the world is subject to the 
laws of science, events outside the mind can be observed, described, explained and 
predicted.  Therefore, to make sense of the outside world all we had to do was to observe it 
(McKenna, 1997, p 121).  
 
By placing rational observation as the key to understanding the social world, positivism 
marked an important step in humanity’s intellectual development. However, it should be 
noted that Comte (1875) regarded it as a new (albeit secular) religion, in that he saw it as 
capable of uncovering inviolable truths gathered together under the umbrella of a unified 
science. Later positivists, most notably those of the Vienna circle of logical positivists, while 
vociferously decrying any form of metaphysics, remained true to the Comtean aspiration to 
the unity of science. 
 
 
Logical positivism 
The aim of the logical positivists was to defend and strengthen positivist empiricism in the 
context of early twentieth century scientific developments. They attempted to shore up 
empiricism in an era where an ever increasing proportion of science’s subject matter was not 
directly observable; a development most dramatically displayed by the replacement of 
classical physics by quantum mechanics. They argued that the theoretical axioms required 
to explain these phenomena, while they could not be verified directly, could be anchored 
empirically by ‘correspondence rules’ (Carnap, 1966) which were amenable to observational 
testing2. 
 
Logical positivists also attempted to strengthen positivism by marshalling the ideas of the 
early Wittgenstein (1974) to argue that empirical knowledge was the only valid form of 
knowing. On the basis of ‘the principle of verifiability’, which states that the meaning of a 
proposition lies in its method of verification (Passmore, 1967), they contended that any 
statement that could not be empirically verified was not just mistaken or confused, but was 
meaningless nonsense (Ayer, 1936). 
 
Challenges to Positivism 
Positivism has faced a number of significant challenges, four of which we will adumbrate 
here. Our discussion is ordered according to the chronology in which the challenges 
emerged. Indeed, Immanuel Kant planted the seeds of the first challenge before Comte was 
even born. These challenges at least partially map on to the four-part typology of paradigms 
proposed by MacKenzie and Knipe (2006) – interpretivist/constructivist; transformative; 
pragmatic; and postpositivist. The Kantian challenge led to what they term the 
‘interpretivist/constructivist paradigm’, and the Marxian challenge to the ‘transformative 
paradigm’. However, in contrast to the problem-driven approach of methodological 
pragmatism, the scientific realism that developed from Durkheim’s challenge to positivism, 
while sharing with the ‘pragmatic paradigm’ a licence for mixed methods research, contains 
well-developed realist ontological and epistemological positions.   
 
These three challenges provided clear alternatives to the positivist model as a means for 
understanding the world. In contrast, the Popperian challenge aimed to improve on 
positivism’s conception of the scientific method. Popper’s challenge led to the paradigm that 
MacKenzie and Knipe term ‘postpositivist’.  
 
The Kantian challenge 
‘It is not that by our sensibility we cannot know the nature of things in themselves in any 
save a confused fashion; we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever’ (Kant, 2007: 
B62).  
 
The first set of interrelated challenges have their wellspring in the philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant (2007), who distinguished between things in themselves (noumena) and what appears 
to our senses (phenomena). He argued that all we can ever have access to are phenomena, 
rendering the objective world unknowable.  
 
Kantian ideas influenced the work of Max Weber (1949), who used their emphasis of the 
importance of the subjective to refute the ability of natural scientific methods to explain 
human behaviour. He argued that understanding social behaviour required interpretation of 
the meanings and motives of the actors involved, whose actions were the result of choice 
rather than determined by social laws. Thus, the naturalist approach of positivism was 
challenged by the rise of interpretivist sociology. 
 
An even more direct line from Kant can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Thus, in 
relation to scientific method, Edmund Husserl (1970) argued that the use of positivistic 
science to uncover human thinking in disciplines such as psychology distorted human 
experience. Once again, the message was that positivism was an inappropriate way to find 
out about people because it treated thinking and feeling human beings as objects.  
 
Another neo-Kantian attack on positivism came via the nineteenth century German 
philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, and in particular his admonition to seekers after 
knowledge:  
 
Let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason’, … 
‘knowledge in itself’: these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely 
unthinkable … in which the active and interpreting forces … are supposed to be lacking … 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’ (Nietzsche, 1969, 119, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism had a major influence on postmodernists’ rejection of grandiose 
explanatory ‘metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 1984). The postmodernist acceptance of 
perspectivism led to their abandonment of any pretentions to generalise knowledge, and to 
their denial of the scientist’s ability to adopt an objective stance.  
 
The Marxian Challenge 
‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ 
(Marx, 1974: 123). 
 
In contrast to the positivist conception of the role of the social scientist as simply describing 
the causal laws that govern human behaviour, Marx argued that structured social relations 
could be altered through political action (Marx and Engels, 2002). The role of the social 
scientist, according to Marx, should be to engage in critical analysis of existing social 
structures with a view to informing political action to overcome the exploitative and 
oppressive relations they contain.  
 
Acceptance of the Marxist position entails a denial of positivism’s objectivism. This 
differentiates between facts and values and argues that scientists, because their job is solely 
to gather empirical information, should eschew the adoption of values, which distort objective 
neutrality. In contrast, Marxists and other critical theorists argue that in order to explain 
social reality, it is essential to evaluate and criticise its own self-understanding (Horkheimer 
and Adorno, 2002). 
 
Marx concentrated on class inequalities between those who owned and controlled the 
means of production and those who did not. However, critical or transformative social 
science has since broadened its scope to encompass other forms of inequality, such as 
those associated with ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation.  
 
The Durkheimian challenge 
‘A social fact is … capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint … [It] is 
general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right, 
independent of its individual manifestations’ (Durkheim, 1966:13). 
 
The nineteenth century French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, challenged positivism’s 
empiricist ontology. As can be seen from the quotation above, Durkheim (1966) expanded 
the definition of what counted as real from ‘individual manifestations’ (i.e. the empirically 
observable events that positivists viewed as constituting reality) to include those forces that 
exercised ‘external constraint’ on events. In doing so, he was setting out the scientific realist 
alternative to positivism.  
 
Scientific realists argue that positivists misunderstand the nature of causation. This 
misunderstanding comes from their acceptance of David Hume’s (1969) empiricism, which 
reduces causal laws to being one and the same as constant conjunctions. In contrast, 
realism asserts the independent reality of causal forces, which they see as ontologically 
distinct from the events they generate. Moving causation from constantly conjoined events to 
generative mechanisms has significant consequences for science. Rather than being 
restricted to describing constant conjunctions, science can start to explain how the influence 
of causal mechanisms is exerted. 
 
Since Durkheim, scientific realism has developed along a number of lines. However, its most 
sustained development as a philosophy of science is critical realism, which combines the 
ontological realism of Durkheim with the critical social science of the Marxist tradition 
(Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1998). 
 
In his examination of the nature of causation, the twentieth century British philosopher, Roy 
Bhaskar (2008), argued that, except in artificially controlled situations such as experimental 
conditions, constant conjunctions rarely pertain. This is because multiple causal 
mechanisms are at play in open systems. There should be acceptance that events in open 
systems are generally caused by a combination of causal mechanisms, which may mutually 
reinforce or undermine each other’s powers. This allows for a more nuanced analysis than 
that of positivism, depicting causation as involving tendencies rather than invariable 
consequences. 
  
For critical realists, the opportunities, restraints and social mores embedded in structured 
social relations have a powerful influence on how people behave (Archer, 1995). Their 
assertion of the power of social mechanisms to influence the patterning of events, including 
human actions, involves a rejection of the neo-Kantian position that explanation of human 
behaviour should be sought solely in the meanings and motivations of the actors involved 
(Weber, 1949; Husserl, 2012).  
 
However, critical realists also reject the Comtean model of causation, which places exclusive 
causal onus on social laws and regards human agency as epiphenomenal. Instead, they 
insist that, because both social structures and human agents possess their own unique 
generative mechanisms, one cannot be reduced to the other (Archer, 1995). They assert the 
need to ‘distinguish sharply … between the genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons, 
intentions and plans of human beings, on the one hand; and the structures governing the 
reproduction and transformation of social activities, on the other’ (Bhaskar, 1989: 79). This in 
turn leads to an assumption of the appropriateness of mixed methods approaches. Patterns 
of events and behaviours can only be demonstrated through numerical calculation. However, 
because ‘meanings cannot be measured, only understood’ (Bhaskar, 1998: 46), qualitative 
approaches are needed to uncover people’s understandings and motivations. 
 
Summary of points of divergence between positivism and alternative paradigms 
The primary points of divergence between positivism and the three perspectives outlined 
above are as follows: 
 Interpretivists’ insistence on the importance of taking into account individuals’ capacity to 
think and to choose to act in certain ways, undermines the determinist philosophy of 
positivism, which sees people’s actions as governed by natural and social laws.  
 A stronger constructivist argument refutes positivism’s claim to be able to uncover objective 
knowledge about a unified reality, adopting a relativism that regards both reality and our 
understandings of it as constantly shifting from one perspective to another. 
 Those from the transformative paradigm argue that acceptance that humans can shape their 
social world is at variance with positivism’s value-neutrality and social determinism, which 
prevents it from contributing to critical analysis of social formations that in turn can be used 
to inform human choices about improving the social world. 
 Realists argue that positivism’s empiricist concentration on establishing laws through the 
observation of constant conjunctions of events leaves it unable to adequately explain 
causation in terms of tendencies, which is how it is almost invariably manifested in open 
systems.  
 A common criticism of positivism from all these perspectives involves their rejection of its 
belief in science’s ability to uncover definitive objective facts.  
 
The Popperian challenge 
‘Observation is always selective … It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a 
point of view, a problem’ (Popper, 1989:46). 
 
Not only has positivism had to contend with profound challenges from alternative 
philosophical positions, it has also been subjected to immanent critiques that demonstrated 
internal inconsistencies. Karl Popper, the twentieth century Austro-British philosopher of 
science, posited the most important of these. As a supporter of the scientific method (and a 
friend of members of the Vienna circle), Popper’s aim was to eliminate positivism’s 
weaknesses. 
 
While subscribing to the general tenets of the scientific method, Popper (1972) believed that 
the positivist conception of the method was weakened by its failure to address what is known 
as the Humean problem of induction. Positivists accepted Hume’s (1969) ontology of 
causation that identified it as the experience of constant conjunctions of events. 
Consequently, they argued, knowledge was generated by the systematic gathering of data to 
demonstrate causal relationships in the form of constant conjunctions. If one event was 
demonstrated to occur repeatedly shortly after another, then the former could be established 
as an effect and the latter as its cause. Such an approach, whereby a general conclusion 
emerges from the observation of a number of particular instances, is known as induction. 
However, positivism’s approach ignored the crucial weakness of inductivism that Hume 
(1969) identified. His argument that observation of past conjunctions is no guarantee that 
they will be observed in the future logically compromised the generalisability of inductively 
generated knowledge about the nature of causal relations. The certainty that Comtean 
positivism aspired to was fatally undermined by the Humean problem of induction. 
 
Recognising the dilemma, logical positivists sought to argue their way out of the 
contradiction between the empiricist principle that only experience could decide between the 
truth and falsity of a statement and the Humean objection that inductive arguments from 
experience are invalid. Following Wittgenstein (1974), they did so by attempting to redefine 
what was meant by a scientific statement. Popper was scathing in his criticism of these 
attempts, accusing them of sharing ‘with all the older attempts an unfounded assumption … 
that all genuine statements must be, in principle, completely decidable’ (Popper, 1972: 312). 
He went on to argue that ‘If this assumption is dropped, then it becomes possible to solve in 
a simple way the problem of induction. We can, quite consistently, interpret natural laws or 
theories as genuine statements which are partially decidable, i.e. which are, for logical 
reasons, not verifiable but, in an asymmetrical way, falsifiable only’ (312-13, emphasis in 
original). In other words, while it is not possible to state definitively that a statement is true, it 
is possible to state definitively that it is false. 
 
In replacing the principle of verification with the principle of falsification, Popper reversed the 
logical flow of scientific endeavour, which for positivists proceeded inductively from 
observation of specific instances to constructing general statements about causal relations.  
Instead, Popper proposed the hypothetico-deductive method, which involved the initial 
formulation of a hypothesis about the nature of a causal relationship, followed by the 
gathering of empirical data to test that hypothesis (the process of deduction), with the aim of 
falsifying rather than verifying it.  
 
The replacement of positivism’s scientific aim of inductive verification by deductive 
falsification marked an important qualification to claims about the epistemological power of 
science. No matter how frequently experimental science fails to falsify a hypothesis, the 
possibility that it will be falsified in the future still remains. This inability of science to 
vouchsafe the causal relations it identifies leads postpositivism to accept that scientific 
knowledge is always provisional and subject to potential falsification. While science may get 
us closer to the truth by ruling out false conjectures, it can never definitively assert that it has 
attained it – scientific statements are only ever ‘partially decidable’.  
 
Popper’s rejection of positivism’s inductive approach involved a rejection of epistemological 
empiricism. For positivists, knowledge could be gained from simply looking at the facts, while 
for Popper this was an untenable position: ‘the belief that we can start with pure 
observations alone, without anything in the nature of theory, is absurd’ (Popper, 1989:46). 
Thus postpositivism asserts the primacy of theory, arguing that science progresses from the 
identification of clearly articulated hypotheses that are posed in such a manner that that they 
are amenable to empirical falsification.  
 
The centrality postpositivism gives to theory has important consequences for how it views 
the role of the scientist. It accepts that the development of scientific knowledge depends 
upon the creation of theoretical conjectures. This involves a conception of scientists as 
having an active and imaginative role to play in the scientific endeavour. This contrasts with 
positivism’s perception of them as passive gatherers of objective data. 
 
While Popper criticises positivism’s exclusive concentration on empirical experience as the 
source of scientific knowledge, asserting instead the crucial role of theory, he shares with 
positivism an ontological empiricism that identifies causation with empirically observable 
events. In other words, while the method of identifying causal relations may have moved 
from induction to the deduction, the object of that process remains the same. Critical realists, 
who assert the independent reality of causal forces, ontologically distinct from the events 
they generate, have challenged this conception of causality. 
 
Popper’s acceptance of positivism’s ontological empiricism also entails a sharing of its 
adherence to scientific value neutrality that asserts that the world is as it is, irrespective of 
how we would wish it to be. It is therefore important, notwithstanding the scientist’s role in 
deciding what aspects of the world should be investigated, that science is conducted in such 
a way that involves the acquisition of facts not tainted by the values of those involved in its 
acquisition. This is in contrast to the transformative paradigm which warrants the 
development of assumptions about how the world should be (Popper, 1957). 
 
Similarities and differences between positivism and postpositivism  
Similarities 
Positivism and postpositivism share the following assumptions: 
 
 The scientific method can be used to understand relations of cause and effect in both the 
social and natural worlds. 
 Systematic and sustained empirical observation is key to gaining knowledge. 
 The focus of science should be on the conjunctions of events because it is the constancy of 
conjunction that constitutes causation. 
 Science should be value neutral.  
 
Differences 
Positivism and postpositivism differ in relation to the following assumptions: 
 
Positivism Postpositivism 
Causal laws are identified by means of 
systematic and sustained empirical 
observation of instances of conjunction 
Hypotheses conjecturing a causal 
relationship are tested by systematic and 
sustained empirical observation of 
(inductivism). 
 
instances of conjunction (hypothetico-
deductivism).  
The existence of causal laws can be 
confirmed if observation reveals the 
constant conjunction of the events being 
investigated (verification). 
The aim of observation is to refute 
hypotheses about causal relationships 
(falsification). 
 
Science is capable of uncovering the true 
nature of causal laws. 
 
While science can rule out false 
conjectures, it can never definitively 
establish the true nature of causal laws. 
The role of the scientist is to systematically 
observe and record instances of constant 
conjunction and to develop or verify 
statements about laws on the basis of those 
observations. 
 
 
The scientist’s role includes the 
development of conjectures and 
hypotheses, which means that they have a 
creative part to play in the research 
process. 
 
 
Positivism, postpositivism and the randomised controlled trial 
In order to demonstrate that, even in the area where the claim of positivism’s salience is 
most persistent, key components of positivism have been rendered redundant, we will now 
examine the methodological underpinnings of the current ‘gold standard’ of the scientific 
method in healthcare research – the randomised controlled trial (RCT). We will support our 
arguments through the use of examples of recent nursing RCTs. 
 
In the literature, confusion often surrounds the question of whether RCTs in healthcare 
research are paradigmatically positioned within positivism or postpositivism. We wish to 
argue that they sit firmly within the postpositivist paradigm. While the assumptions 
underlying RCTs include those that are common to positivism and postpositivism, they also 
include an acceptance of hypothetico-deductivism, falsification, the provisional nature of 
scientific knowledge, and the active role of the scientist in selecting scientific problems. On 
these grounds, it is inappropriate to label RCTs as being founded on positivism. 
 
In terms of the common assumptions of positivism and postpositivism, RCTs’ comparison of 
experimental groups that are exposed to interventions with control groups that are not entails 
the adoption of the scientific method. In addition, they use systematic and sustained 
observation to measure the frequency of conjunction between the intervention and the 
outcome of interest in comparison to the frequency of the outcome’s occurrence in the 
control group. Through their adoption of blinding procedures, they are designed to ensure 
that the predispositions of the scientists and subjects involved will not bias the results of the 
trial (Altman, 1991; Jadad, 1998). 
 
In terms of the differences, RCTs do not simply gather data with a view to identifying 
effective therapies, but commence with hypotheses that are then empirically tested (Jadad, 
1998). For example, an RCT of a nursing intervention for pressure ulcer prevention was 
based on the primary hypothesis that “…the incidence rate of HAPU [hospital acquired 
pressure ulcers] in at-risk hospitalised patients who receive a PUPCB [pressure ulcer 
prevention care bundle] will be lower than that in those receiving standard care” (Chaboyer 
et al., 2016, p 64).  
 
While Chaboyer et al.’s positive directional hypothesis might be taken as demonstration that 
the positivist strategy of verification remains the dominant approach, the use of this form of 
hypothesis in RCT reports is essentially a literary device used for clarity. It does not reflect 
the actual processes involved in RCTs, where inferential statistics are used to test null 
hypotheses, which predict that no causal relationship exists (Machin et al., 2007). Thus, the 
testing of null hypotheses in RCTs, notably through the use of p (probability) values that 
seek to measure the probability of observed outcomes being the result of chance, adhere to 
the postpositivist dictum that scientific research should aim for falsification rather than 
verification. Numerous examples of the use of p values in nurse-led RCTs can be given 
(see, for example, Dumville et al., 2009; Mooney et al., 2014). 
 
The greater evidential weight given to systematic and meta-analytic reviews of multiple 
RCTs than to individual RCTs indicates an acceptance that, notwithstanding their rigour, the 
results obtained from RCTs should not be regarded as definitive (Gough et al., 2012). Thus, 
for example, an RCT evaluating an educational programme to reduce the use of external 
restraints by staff on patients with dementia came to the conclusion that ‘staff education can 
… reduce the use of physical restraints’. (Pelifolk et al. (2010:62). However, a Cochrane 
systematic review which included five cluster-randomised controlled trials which met 
Cochrane quality criteria (including that of Pelifolk et al.) came to the conclusion that ‘There 
is insufficient evidence supporting the effectiveness of educational interventions targeting 
nursing staff for preventing or reducing the use of physical restraints in geriatric long-term 
care’ (Möhler et al., 2011:2). 
 
Because the selection of hypotheses to be tested by RCTs is discretionary, scientists have a 
creative role to play in the direction in which science develops. One way they do this is by 
identifying problems that they regard as worthy of investigation. Thus Hanson et al. 
(2005:577) provide a rationale for their evaluation of a quality improvement intervention 
targeted at palliative care in nursing homes with the following statement: ‘Death is a frequent 
occurrence in nursing homes, yet few clinical quality standards promote excellence in 
palliative care for those who die in this setting’.  
 
It can be seen from the above review that postpositivist tenets, rather than those of 
positivism, animate contemporary randomised controlled trials in the field of nursing.  
 
 
 
Contemporary nursing research paradigms 
The strong influence of postpositivism in the areas of experimental and quasi-experimental 
health research should not be taken to indicate that we have reached the end of 
methodological history. Even within the paradigm, it is recognised that postpositivist 
strategies contain problematic tensions with which researchers and methodologists continue 
to struggle. These include the artificiality of RCTs’ controlled settings, which compromises 
their ability to predict the effects of interventions in everyday clinical settings, and their focus 
on average effects, which blinds them to human individuality (Rothwell, 2005; Ernest et al., 
2015). Attempts have been made within the parameters of the postpositivist paradigm to 
address these problems, a notable example being the British Medical Research Council’s 
(MRC) Framework for the Development and Evaluation of Complex Healthcare Interventions 
(MRC, 2008). 
 
More widely, it can be noted that the current state of play in nursing research methodology is 
one of pluralism. Acceptance of the importance to successful nursing care of patients’, 
relatives’ and clinicians’ experiences and motivations has provided a solid foundation for 
those paradigms that assert the need for interpretation (Streubert and Carpenter, 2011). 
Conversely, the rise of evidence-based nursing, with its assertion of the need for robust 
evidence about the effectiveness of nursing interventions has encouraged the adoption of 
evaluation strategies that sit within the ambit of postpositivism (Porter and O’Halloran, 2009).  
 
While the increasing acceptance of pluralism has led to a cooling off of paradigmatic wars, 
this does not mean that conflict has ceased altogether. While there is mostly a patrician 
silence from the confident ranks of postpositivist methodologists, adherents to alternative 
paradigms continue to point out what they see as postpositivism’s errors. Probably the most 
vociferous critics here have been postmodernists, who have gone so far as to accuse 
scientifically guided evidence-based practice of being fascistic in its dehumanisation of the 
individual (Holmes et al., 2006). 
 
The current attitude of realists to postpositivism’s scientific method is more ambiguous. 
While they are at one in pointing out what they see as its weaknesses and contradictions 
(Porter and O’Halloran, 2012; Pawson, 2013), they are divided about what should be done 
about them. Some (Marchal et al., 2013; van Belle et al., 2016) argue that experimental 
designs’ reliance on the notion of constant conjunction means that they cannot provide an 
adequate understanding of how and why things work. Others (Bonell et al., 2012; Porter et 
al., 2017) argue that the RCT, with its capacity to identify the efficacy of an intervention 
within the confines of a closed system, is a necessary but not sufficient methodology, and 
needs to be combined with realist-based interrogations of individual experience and social 
context. 
 The most acute controversy between critical realism and postpositivism is grounded in the 
former’s acceptance of transformative assumptions, which lead critical realists to challenge 
the postpositivist dichotomy between rationally-based reasoning and value-based reasoning. 
They have pointed out that as beings whose relation to the world is one of concern (Sayer, 
2011), humans constantly use empirical knowledge to inform their concerns about present or 
future flourishing or suffering. While those who espouse value neutrality may be formally 
correct in their assertion that ‘ought’ cannot be logically derived from ‘is’, from a realist 
perspective, ‘[t]he force of the “ought” . . . is not a matter of the logical relations between 
statements, but of bodily needs or compulsions – states of being or becoming, not 
statements’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 51). Thus, a factual statement that describes an objective 
human need or lack contains within itself the inference that there is merit in responding to 
alleviate that need or lack. This argument has particular resonance for nurse researchers, 
given their shared acceptance that the avoidance of avoidable suffering of patients is a 
paramount value position (Porter, 2016). 
 
Ironically, the paradigm identified by MacKenzie and Knipe (2006) that has not been 
considered in depth here – the pragmatic paradigm – has, with the rise in popularity of 
mixed-methods approaches (Curry and Nunez-Smith, 2014) that are intimately associated 
with it, been one of the success stories of the last decade. The reason why we have not 
concentrated on pragmatic approaches is that their paradigmatic characteristics are very 
unclear. To the extent that pragmatic simply refers to the belief that research methods 
should be considered according to their practical consequences (Peirce 1958), it is hard to 
see them as constituting a distinct paradigm. To the extent that the pragmatic paradigm flags 
an adherence to the anti-foundationalism of Richard Rorty’s pragmatism (1991), then it can 
be categorised as another variant of Nietzschean perspectivism. Ambiguity is not lessened 
by consideration of the paradigmatic location of mixed-methods approaches. While often 
associated with pragmatism, they can be equally applicable in other paradigms including the 
transformative (Mertens, 2005), realist (Allmark and Machaczek, 2018) and postpositivist 
(Medical Research Council, 2008).  Nevertheless, we would be remiss not to acknowledge 
that, with the cooling off of the paradigmatic wars, pragmatism’s influence continues to grow. 
 
It will be noted that positivism has not been mentioned in this summing up of contemporary 
healthcare methodology. While some of its tenets continue to animate the postpositivist 
paradigm (and continue to be the focus of critics of postpositivism), as a coherent 
overarching paradigm, it is now of little more than historical interest. 
 
Conclusion: the redundancy of positivism 
The previously hegemonic position of positivism has long gone. Many social and healthcare 
researchers have abandoned it in favour of paradigms that they believe better incorporate 
the experiences, needs and aspirations of human subjects. However, while the interpretive, 
transformative and realist paradigms challenged the dominance of the positivist paradigm, 
they did not render it redundant. As long as positivism could claim to provide the 
paradigmatic structure for the scientific method, it could still assert its relevance. What finally 
rendered positivism redundant was the emergence of postpositivism, which supplanted it on 
the methodological territory that it had claimed as its own.  
 
While debate continues about where best to locate healthcare research, that debate has 
moved on from consideration of the appropriateness of positivism as a foundational 
philosophy. The twin pincers of anti-positivist and postpositivist paradigms have divested it of 
its raison d’être. It is therefore anachronistic for nursing methodologists and research 
methods textbook writers to continue to refer to positivism as a pertinent research paradigm 
for contemporary nursing, just as it is inappropriate for nurse researchers to be expected to 
defend their work from a positivist stance.  
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Endnotes 
1. Like many sweeping historical schema, Popper’s can be accused of over-
simplification. For example, there is evidence that medieval thought was considerably 
more disputatious that Popper indicates (Marenbon, 2007). 
2. While logical positivism had disintegrated as a distinctive philosophical position by 
the 1940s (Passmore, 1967), its echoes continued in Anglo-American thought, not 
least through influence of the diaspora of those associated with it. Thus, the 
emphasis that logical empiricists such Hempel (1965) placed on the importance of 
theoretical axioms as the foundation of scientific disciplines provided considerable 
impetus for the development of nursing theories and conceptual frameworks in the 
1970s and 80s (Risjord, 2010).  
 
